The most important security requirements to secure electronic mail (e-mail) systems are: confidentiality, authentication, non-repudiation and data integrity. In conventional e-mail systems, Secure/Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions (S/MIME) and Pretty Good Privacy (PGP) digital envelops are used to satisfy these security requirements. However, confidentiality and authentication are performed in two different phases, which increases computations and leads to more energy consumption. Moreover, the receiver can easily reveal the source of the message, violating the sender's privacy. In this paper, we propose a low-cost deniably authenticated encryption scheme (DA-ENS), where all the cryptographic primitives are being performed in a single logical step to achieve these goals. Experimental results show that our scheme, DA-ENS, achieves low computational cost and communication overhead at 80-bit, 112-bit, 128-bit, 192-bit and 256-bit security levels. Energy consumption is shown to be reduced to 80%, 67%, 42%, 62% and 48% compared to similar schemes SL+BF, LXJ+BF, Fagen Li et al.(FL), AJL and CZJZJSZ respectively. Also, we have proven that, our scheme DA-ENS is provably secure in random oracle model.
I. INTRODUCTION
In the current era of digital information, electronic mail (e-mail) is considered to be a common and widely used medium of communication. Whether it is used for personal or general purposes, business or non-business purposes, security is an essential and critical requirement. An e-mail systems is vulnerable to several security threats. These threats are summarized in the following list:
• Privacy Invasion: When all or part of a message is revealed to an unauthorized person.
• Theft of identity: When a person impersonates another one, thereby reading and sending e-mails as if he is the true owner of the e-mail account.
• Message tampering: An unauthorized person intercepts a message and alters its contents.
• Repudiation: The denial of the message origin or its authenticity.
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To protect e-mail systems against the prospective threats, a secure e-mail system should satisfy the following security requirements [1] - [3] :
• Confidentiality: The message is read by the intended receiver(s) only.
• Authenticity: The message originated from the designated sender. The recipient should be able to prove that the given e-mail is really initiated by the specified sender.
• Data Integrity: This ensures that the message has not been changed, by an unauthorized user, before or during the transmission of the message.
• Strong fairness [1] : The sender should obtain a proof of receipt from the receiver, when the receiver receives the e-mail certified by the sender. This process protects from false denials.
There are three major types of e-mail encryption protocols that can help in satisfying the above security requirements: Simple Mail Transfer Protocol(SMTP) [4] , VOLUME 7, 2019 This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License. For more information, see http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ Secure/Multipurpose Internet Mail Extension (S/MIME) [5] and Pretty Good Privacy (PGP) [6] . The drawback of SMTP is that a person with administrative privileges to SMTP servers can modify or even delete the e-mail sent by other people through the SMTP servers. In PGP, the main drawback is in the key distribution mechanism where PGP key servers are used. Anyone can construct and use a key having any name on it [7] , [8] . For example, there may be numerous keys on the PGP key servers with the name ''Bill Gates'' on them, but none of them may actually belong to the founder of Microsoft Corporation.
A. WORKFLOW OF e-MAIL SYSTEMS
A standard e-mail system model is presented in Fig 1 .
An e-mail message is sent from the sender's Mail User Agent (MUA), such as Mozilla Thunderbird, Microsoft Outlook, Eudora Mail, Incredible or Lotus Notes, to the mail server that contains a Mail Transfer Agent (MTA) software. A sender MTA transfers the message to the recipient's MTA using the Simple Mail Transfer Protocol (SMTP), so they are logically called SMTP servers. The recipient's MTA then delivers the message to the incoming Mail Delivery Agent (MDA), which stores the message and waits for the recipient to read it. There are two main protocols used to retrieve e-mails from an MDA: POP3 (Post Office Protocol), and IMAP (Internet Message Access Protocol). POP3, the older of the two, is used to retrieve e-mails and, in certain cases, leave a copy of it on the server. IMAP is used to coordinate the e-mail status (read, deleted, moved) across multiple e-mail clients. With IMAP, a copy of every message is stored in the server, and is synced with all the copies in the clients. For this reason, incoming mail servers are called POP servers or IMAP servers, depending on which protocol is used. To protect e-mails from unauthorized access, MDA is protected by a user login-name and password.
B. MOTIVATION AND CONTRIBUTION
The two most important security requirements for a secure e-mail system are confidentiality and authentication. PGP and S/MIME are well-known e-mail protocols that provide the two security goals by performing encryption and digital signature in two individual respective phases. However, the two protocols operate as digital envelopes, which results in heavy computational cost in terms of processing time and energy consumption. One of the main drawbacks of traditional e-mail systems is that a recipient, after receiving the intended message, may easily disclose the source of the message, violating the sender's privacy. This means it lacks deniable authentication. In [9] , a deniable authenticated encryption scheme for e-mail systems is proposed. However this scheme is interactive and based on pairing, which renders the computational cost significantly high.
In this paper, we propose our design of a provably secure deniable authenticated encryption scheme DA-ENS, where all security goals, confidentiality, non-repudiation, integrity and deniable authentication, can be achieved in a single logical step. Since the pairing operation is a heavy cryptographic operation, we have avoided using it in our scheme. From the empirical analysis, We have shown that the proposed scheme DA-ENS achieves low computational cost, communication overhead and energy consumption. Moreover, we compare the performance using different security levels: 80-bit, 112-bit, 128-bit, 192-bit and 256 bit.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. A brief overview of related work is presented in Section II. In Section III, we introduce and explain the mathematical assumptions related to our work. The adversary model is presented in Section IV-A, and the proposed scheme in Section V. The performance analysis is conducted in Section VI. Experiments and their results are discussed and analyzed in Section VII. Finally, conclusions are drawn in Section VIII.
II. RELATED WORK
In this section, we present the previous work related to secure e-mail protocols PGP, S/MIME, deniable authentication(DA) and authenticated encryption(AE). Authentication can be classified into two types: entity authentication and message authentication. Entity authentication is the process whereby one party is assured, through acquisition of corroborative evidence, of the identity of a second party involved in a protocol,and that the second has actually participated. Message or data authentication is a procedure that allows communicating parties to verify that the received or stored messages are authentic. An authenticated Encryption (AE) scheme should achieve two security goals confidentiality and authenticity. AE is the set of cryptographic primitives that allow the communicating parties to verify that the received ciphertext is authentic. An AE scheme is designed either based on a symmetric key cryptosystem or an asymmetrickey cryptosystem [10] - [12] .
Deniable Authentication (DA) is different from traditional authentication cryotographic. In deniable authentication, the intended receiver can identify the source of the given message but cannot prove the source of the message to a third party. There are many applications that require DA, such as electronic voting, secure negotiation over internet, and privacy-preserving location-based services [13] - [15] . The symmetric key based AE is deniable, whereas the asymmetric key based AE is non-deniable.
Security in e-mail applications was not in the focus in the early days of the Internet. e-mail application architectures were more interested in improving the transmission and reception operations than in studying security gaps. One of the early security protocols used in e-mail applications is the public-key cryptography. In this protocol, each user has a pair of keys, public and private. A user, Bob, publishes his public key to the others so that they can use it to encrypt the messages sent to Bob. When Bob receives an encrypted message, he uses his private key to decrypt the message. The two well-known protocols, S/MIME [16] and PGP [17] were first introduced for e-mail security. Subsequently, a few other early-stage protocols, namely GPG [18] , [19] and Transport Layer Security (TLS) [18] , [20] , have emerged. Some e-mail providers, such as Google in its Gmail application, use TLS, which evolved from the Secure Socket Layer (SSL) protocol [18] .
In PGP and S/MIME, each user has to maintain two pairs of public/private keys. One pair is used for message encryption, and the other pair is used for digital signature. Both PGP and S/MIME use digital envelopes to provide message confidentiality. The operation of these protocols is described as follows:
• Sender, Bob, randomly picks a number, and use it as a session key to encrypt the message by using symmetric key encryption scheme.
• Using asymmetric key cryptosystem, Bob encrypts the session key using the receiver's public key.
• The encrypted message and the encrypted session key are concatenated together and sent to the receiver, Alice.
• After receiving the encrypted message, Alice decrypts it using her private key to get the session key.
• Alice uses the session key to decrypt the cipher text and obtain the original message. Both protocols use digital signature for message authentication, which is described as follows:
• The sender, Bob, signs the message digest using his private key.
• The resulting signature is attached to the encrypted message.
• The receiver, Alice, verifies the validity of the signature using Bob's public key. Since digital signatures provide non-repudiation evidence of the sender, the receiver can prove the source to any third party. To resolve this problem, Harn and Re [2] constructed a new scheme, namely the HR scheme, to provide deniable authentication in e-mail systems. In the HR scheme, a sender signs the ciphertext of a session key directly instead of signing the message digest, which makes the signature forgeable to achieve deniability for the authentication. In this construction, the recipient can identify the origin of the given message, but it cannot prove the source to any third party. Hence, this provides deniable authentication. However, Ki et al. [21] proved that the HR scheme is not fully deniable. The transcripts generated by the sender are realistically distinguishable from those generated by a receiver when the public key encryption scheme is secure against chosen cipher text attack (CCA).
A fully deniable authentication scheme, called HLLC, was proposed by Harn et al. [22] in 2011. Although the scheme provides confidentiality, it is not suitable for e-mail security because of its interactive nature. In addition, the authors didn't provide a formal security proof of the scheme. Similarly, there have been several deniable authentication schemes [23] that are not suitable for e-mail systems, because of their interactive natures.
III. MATHEMATICAL ASSUMPTIONS
Public key cryptography relies upon some mathematical hard problems such as Integer Factorization Problem (IFP), Discrete Logarithm Problem (DLP), Diffie-Hellman Problem (DHP). In this paper, we consider the discrete logarithm and Diffie-Hellman problem based on Elliptic Curve. The elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem is defined as follows:
Definition 1: Let E be an elliptic curve over a finite field F q , where q is a prime number. Given two points P,
Definition 2: The Discrete Logarithm (DL) problem is hard; Let G be an additive cyclic group with generator P.
The assumption (t, )-DL holds in G if there does not exist any adversary A with running time t that has advantage in solving the DL problem.
To achieve confidentiality over an insecure channel, the Elliptic-Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) protocol is used. The ECDH allows two parties, having an elliptic-curve public/private key pair, to generate a symmetric secret key, and use it to encrypt subsequent messages. The ECDH allows the shared secret key to be computed independently by each party, using some agreed upon parameters, and the public/private keys. The ECDH or Computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) problem is defined as follows:
Definition 3: Let G be an additive cyclic group with generator P and order n. Let a, b ∈ Z * q be chosen randomly in the interval [1, n − 1]. Then the shared secret key is computed using the product of abP.
Definition 4: The Computational Diffie-Hellman problem (CDH) is hard: Let G be an additive cyclic group with generator P. The assumption (t, )-CDH in G holds, if there does not exist any polynomially solvable adversary A in running time t which has advantage in solving the CDH problem.
Given an additive cyclic group G formed on the elliptic curve E over finite field F q , denoted by E(F q ). The cyclic group G is of prime order q and primitive element P. The Decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) problem is defined as follows:
Definition 5: Given the elements (P, aP, bP, cP) for unknown a, b, c ∈ Z * q , decide whether c ≡ ab mod q holds, then (P, aP, bP, cP) is called a valid Diffie-Helman tuple. In the complexity assumption, there is a well-known problem, known as Gap Diffie-Hellman (GDH) problem. The GDH problem is to compute a given instance (P, aP, bP) of the CDH problem applying the DDH oracle. Given the instances (P, aP, bP, cP), decide whether c ≡ ab mod q or not. If (P, aP, bP, cP) is a valid Diffie-Hellman tuple, we denote DDH(P, aP, bP, cP) = ''1''; otherwise DDH(P, aP, bP, cP) = ''0''. Definition 6: The ( gdh , t, q ddh )-GDH assumption holds if there does not exist a polynomially solvable adversary A that have an advantage of at least gdh to solve the GDH problem after the submission of at most q ddh number of queries to the DDH oracle in t running time.
IV. A GENERIC FRAMEWORK OF THE DENIABLE AUTHENTICATED ENCRYPTION (DAE) SCHEME
In this section, we define a generic model of the Deniably Authenticated Encryption (DAE) scheme, which consists of the following four probabilistic polynomially solvable algorithms.
• Setup: Given a security parameter θ as input, it generates the system parameter param as output.
• KeyGen:
The key generation algorithm takes the system parameter param as input, and returns the public and the private key pairs, (PK s , SK s ) and (PK r , SK r ), of the sender and the receiver, respectively.
• DAuth-Encrypt: The deniably authenticated encryption algorithm takes as inputs the message m, the sender's private key SK s , the sender's public PK s , and the receiver's public key PK r , and produces the ciphertext σ .
• DAuth-Decrypt: The deniably authenticated decryption algorithm takes as inputs the cipher text σ , the receiver's private key SK r , the receiver's public PK s and the sender's public key PK r . If σ is an invalid ciphertext, it outputs an error symbol ⊥, otherwise it returns the plain text message m.
The model is represented in Figure 2 for better understanding.
A. ADVERSARY MODEL AND SECURITY
The two important security goals, namely confidentiality and deniable authentication, are achieved by a DAE algorithm to be presented in algorithm-2. For confidentiality, the security notion is indistinguishable against adaptive Chosen Ciphertext Attack (IND-CCA2) and deniably authenticated against chosen message attack (DA-CMA) [24] .
B. SECURITY NOTION FOR IND-CCA2
We adopt this notion where the IND-CCA2 game is played between the challenger B and an adversary A such that B uses A as a subroutine. The notion is described as follows: Initial: B executes the Setup algorithm taking the security parameter, θ , as input and outputs the systems parameter, param.
KeyGen: The systems parameters, param, are passed to the KeyGen algorithm in B to obtain the public and the private key pairs (PK s , SK s ) and (PK r , SK r ) for both the sender and the receiver, respectively. Then B provides the public keys PK s and PK r to A. Now, the game undergoes the following two phases:
Phase-I: A can ask a series of polynomially bounded number of queries to the deniably authenticated encryption and decryption oracles in a adaptive manner. A provides a message m to B, and B executes the deniably authenticated encryption oracle which outputs the ciphertext, σ , as shown in Equation 1
DAuth − Encrypt(m, SK s , PK s , PK r ) = σ
Then B sends σ to A. In deniably authenticated decryption, oracle A submits a ciphertext σ to B. Then B executes the oracle, which outputs the plain text message m provided that the ciphertext is valid one. Otherwise, it returns an error symbol ⊥ to A, as shown in Equation 2
DAuth
Challenge: A selects two plaintext messages m 0 and m 1 of equal length and sends them to B. B picks a random bit ξ ∈ {0, 1} and executes the oracle of deniably authenticated encryption on m ξ that outputs the ciphertextσ . This is obtained from the oracle DAuth-Encrypt(m ξ , SK s , PK s , PK r ). B sends the challenge ciphertextσ to A.
Phase-II: As in phase-I, A would submit a series of polynomially bounded number of queries in an adaptive manner to the deniably authenticated encryption and decryption oracles. Here the limitation is that A cannot send queries to deniably authenticated decryption oracle on the challenge ciphertext .
Guess: A produces ξ as its guess, and wins the game if ξ = ξ . The advantage of A can be defined as in Equation 3 .
The notion of security would be specified as deniable authentication against chosen message attack (DA-CMA), following the security notion described in [24] . In DAE, both the sender and the receiver would produce a valid ciphertext. In digital signature, only the sender can produce a valid signature using his own private key. The accepted security notion for digital signature is existential unforgeability against chosen message attack (EUF-CMA) in an adaptive manner. A modified version of EUF-CMA in DAE is called DA-CMA. The DA-CMA game, played between a challenger B and an adversary F, can be described as follows: Initial: B executes the Setup algorithm taking the security parameter, θ , as input, and producing the system parameter param as output.
KeyGen: The KeyGen algorithm in B takes param as input, and provides the public and private key pairs (PK s , SK s ) and (PK r , SK r ) for both the sender and the receiver respectively. Then B provides the public keys PK s and PK r to F.
Attack: F would ask a polynomially bounded number of queries to the deniably authenticated encryption and decryption oracles in the DA-CMA game. At the end of the game, F produces a valid ciphertextσ , and wins the game if and only if the following conditions hold: 1) DAuth-Decrypt(σ * , SK r , PK r , PK s ) = m * 2) F has not submitted a query to deniably authenticated encryption oracle on m * Guess: F produces ξ as its guess, and wins the game if ξ = ξ . The advantage of F can be defined as in Equation 4 .
V. THE PROPOSED SCHEME
Based on the generic model defined in Section IV, our scheme consists of three main algorithms namely, key generation KeyGen, Deniable Authenticated Encryption DAuth-Encrypt and Deniable Authenticated Decryption DAuth-Decrypt, in addition to a fourth one to check deniability Deniability-Check.
In the construction of the protocol DA-ENS, the system sets an elliptic curve E over Z p such that E(Z p ) forms an abelian group. Further, the number of points in E(Z p ) is divisible by a large prime, say n. Let P ∈ E(Z p ) be the generator, or base point of order n. The system chooses an integer θ as a security parameter such that n > 2 θ . It sets two collision resistant hash functions H 1 and H 2 , such that H 1 , H 2 : {0, 1} * → G. This publishes the systems parameters param which is (n, E, p, P, H 1 , H 2 ).
Both the sender and the receiver key pairs are generated by key generation algorithm, KeyGen, as shown in Algorithm 1. u ∈ [1, n − 1] is chosen randomly. 5 :
Algorithm 1 KeyGen
The output of DAuth-Encrypt are the tuples (c, λ, U , R) which represent the deniably authenticated ciphertext. When the recipient receives σ , as shown in Algorithm 2, it performs exclusive OR operation bit-by-bit on ciphertext c and obtains the plaintext message m * . Finally, the receiver verifies the resulting message. If it is correct, it accepts the message, otherwise returns a symbol ''⊥'' for rejection.
In Algorithm-2, the encryption of the message is performed using an exclusive OR operation bit-by-bit. We can consider the symmetric encryption scheme, Advanced Encryption Standard (AES), which encrypts the message m into c, E k (m * ) = c, where c ← m * ⊕ k, and the decryption will be D k (c) = m * , where m * ← c ⊕ k. The symmetric encryption scheme is considered to protect the proposed scheme against passive attacks [9] and to make the encryption and decryption process faster.
Operation of the proposed scheme DA-ENS described in algorithms 2 and 3 is represented in Figure 3 . The symbol OP is used to denote the cryptographic operations; addition, multiplication and subtraction. Other symbols are defined in Table 1 . else return ⊥ 10: end 
A. PROOF OF CORRECTNESS AND DENIABILITY
This section shows the consistency of the elements W and R. It follows that:
In addition, we need to show that d r U = R. It follows that: d r U = d r γ P = γ Q r = R Definition 7: An encryption scheme is said to be deniable if both ciphers generated from the same message, by the sender and the receiver, using their own private keys, are indistinguishable from each other.
The ciphertext generated by the receiver using its private key d r would be indistinguishable from the ciphertext generated by the sender with its private key d s . To simulate because (c,λ,Ũ ,R) is constructed from a randomly chosen valueũ ∈ [1, n − 1].
B. SECURITY
Security of the proposed scheme DA-ENS relies on the mathematical hard problems CDH and GDH defined in Section-III. The security notion for confidentiality is indistinguishability against chosen ciphertext attack, and for digital signature is existential forgeability against chosen message attack. Both security notions have been proven in theorems 1 and 2 respectively. Theorem 1: Assume that there is an IND-CCA2 adversary A which can distinguish the ciphertext during the IND-CCA2 game with an advantage against DA-ENS running in time t. The adversary A asks at most q h 1 and q h 2 queries to random oracles H 1 and H 2 , respectively, and q e and q d queries to deniable authenticated encryption and decryption oracles, respectively. Then there exists an algorithm B that can solve GDH problem in time t and q ddh queries with probability
Proof: See Appendix A. Theorem 2: Assume that there is an DA-CMA adversary F which is able to forge a given ciphertext during the DA-CMA game with an advantage against DA-ENS running in time t. The adversary F asks at most q h 1 and q h 2 queries to random oracles H 1 and H 2 respectively and q e and q d queries to deniable authenticated encryption and decryption oracles respectively. Then there exists an algorithm B that is able to solve the GDH problem in time t and using q ddh queries with probability dae ≤ gdh + q e (q h 1 + q h 2 ) + q d + 1 2 θ VOLUME 7, 2019 where t = O(t + t h 1 + t h 2 + t e + t d ) and q ddh = O(q h 1 + q h 2 + q d ).
Proof: See Appendix B
VI. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
In this section, we compute the computational cost in terms of the cryptographic operations executed in a scheme. In addition, we evaluate the computational time and communication overhead with respect to the security levels: 80-bit, 112-bit, 128-bit, 192-bit and 256-bit [25] , and compare with the related works [9] . The schemes in [26] , [27] and [10] are not directly deniable-authenticated encryption schemes. Rather, they provide deniability of authenticated messages followed by encryption. The schemes, SL+BF and LXJ+BF, are named following the notation used in [9] . The SL+BF scheme combines the deniable authentication scheme proposed in [26] and the encryption scheme provided in [27] . Similarly, the LXJ+BF scheme combines the work proposed in [10] for deniable authentication and the encryption scheme in [26] . AJL and CZJZJSZ are the Certificateless deniably authenticated encryption schemes proposed in [28] and [29] respectively. Since paring is a costly cryptographic operation, our proposed scheme DA-ENS avoids using it. The computational cost is evaluated in terms of cryptographic operations performed at both the sender and the receiver end. The cost has been compared with the related schemes and illustrated in Table 7 . Communication overhead is computed in terms of group element size, length of message digest, and size of messages. The communication overhead is evaluated and compared with respect to the security level specification given in table 5. It can be observed that for 80-bit, 112-bit, 128-bit, 192-bit and 256-bit security level, the corresponding digest sizes of MAC are 160 bits, 224 bits, 256 bits, 384 bits and 512 bits respectively.
In the evaluation of communication overhead, the size of group elements defined in Table 6 can be reduced using the standard compression techniques [30] . Table 4 specifies the corresponding compressed sizes of group elements. Based on this, we obtain the communication overhead (CO) of the schemes SL+BF, LXJ+BF, FL, AJL, CZJZJSZ and DA-ENS, for the given security level, as shown in the following equations:
CO AJL = |G 1 | + |G 2 | + 2|m| (8)
CO DA−ENS = 2|G 1 | + |MAC| + |m| (10) Table 3 illustrates the communication overhead of all schemes at different security levels. The size of the transmit- ted messages ranges from 0 to 1000 in a step increase of 100. Figure 5 draws the communication overhead of all schemes at the 80-bit security level.
Similarly, figures 6, 7, 8 and 9 show the comparison at 112-bit, 128-bit, 192-bit and 256-bit security levels respectively. We can observe that the DA-ENS scheme has relatively less communication overhead than the other schemes.
The evaluation of computational time is based on the total number of cryptographic operations performed in algo-rithms1 and 2. We consider the computational time of pairing computation (PC), point multiplication (PM) in group G 1 and exponent computation (EC) in group G 2 . Since the running time of other operations are relatively very low, it is ignored in the evaluation. In addition, we follow the specification given in table 5 and evaluate the computational time for 80-bit, 112-bit, 128-bit, 192-bit and 256-bit security levels.
VII. EXPERIMENTAL ANALYSIS
We implemented our proposed scheme, DA-ENS, together with the relevant schemes: SL+BF, LXJ+BF, FL, AJL and CZJZJSZ to compare their performance. We used three performance measures to evaluate and compare the different schemes: computation time, communication overhead, and computational energy. The experiments have been conducted on a Dell Latitude E6430 computer with Intel Core i5 3210M, 2.5GHz and 4 GB RAM. We have used PBC library [31] for implementation using Type A pairing constructed on curve for prime q ≡ 3 mod 4, where the embedded degree is 2 and the order of G 1 is p. We follow the implementation process of AES, as in [25] , and use the five kind of parameters that represent 80-bit, 112-bit, 128-bit, 196-bit and 256-bit AES key size security levels. Figure 4 summarizes the running time of these algorithms with respect to the 80-bit, 112-bit, 128-bit, 196-bit and 256-bit security levels. The running time out-performance ratios is computed by using the following equation and is summarized in table 9 .
where t x is the running time of scheme x, and t DA−ENS is the running time of the DA-ENS scheme. Given the speci- fications of the machine were the experiment are conducted, we observed that the execution time of point multiplication in G 1 , pairing computation and exponent operation in G 2 require 15.927 ms, 26.68 ms and 3.126 ms respectively. Based on table 7, the running time t x is computed at all security level, and is summarised in table 8.
After substituting these values in Equation 11 . It is found that the DA-ENS scheme achieves the least computational times compared to the other schemes at all security levels.
To evaluate the computational energy cost, we adopted the experimental analysis done in [32] - [34] . Let the current drawn in active mode, receiving mode, and transmitting mode be 8.0 mA, 10 mA and 27 mA respectively. MICA2's power level is 3.0 V and data rate is 12.4 kbps. The computational energy cost evaluated in [34] , [35] for cryptographic operations is calculated and listed in Table 10 . Then the computational energy at both the sender and the receiver end can be computed as in Table 11 .
Out-performance ratios of computational energy cost in percentage is computed by using equation 12 = 48% respectively. This is summarized in Table 11 and drawn in Figure 10 . 
VIII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we proposed Deniable Authenticated Encryption Scheme (DA-ENS), a low-cost protocol with high level of security for e-mail applications. Since DA-ENS provides both confidentiality and deniable authentication, we have proven its security against DA-CMA and IND-CCA2 in the random oracle model. We compared the performance of the proposed scheme with the other relevant protocols, taking into consideration the different security levels: 80-bit, 112-bit, 128-bit, 192-bit and 256-bit. We implemented the protocols, and showed that the running time, the communication overhead and the computational energy of DA-ENS is relatively less than the other protocols designed for e-mail applications.
APPENDIXES APPENDIX A PROOF OF THEOREM 1
Proof: The algorithm B executes A as a subroutine and plays A's challenger in the IND-CCA2 game. B would take the random instances (P, aP, bP) as input and attempt to compute W * = abP. In fact, this is the contradiction of GDH problem assumption. A would submit the queries in an adaptive manner to the random oracles of deniably authenticated encryption and decryption. Also A may consult B for answer of the queries to random oracles H 1 and H 2 . B constructs two sets as L H 1 1 and L H 1 2 for H 1 oracle. Similarly constructs L H 2 1 and L H 2 2 for H 2 oracle. These two sets would store the answers when A ask by submitting the queries to these oracles. The purpose of this simulation is B uses these answers from the sets and attempt to compute W * = abP. Initial: At the beginning of the game IND-CCA2, B initializes the systems parameters param by executing Setup algorithm. B selects a random number k * ∈ {0, 1} n to compute H (W * ), where W * is unknown to B. Further, B picks numbers γ * and λ * from Z p randomly. Constructs sender's public key as Q s = λ * −1 (γ * P − aP) and receiver's public key as b · P. B returns Q s and Q r and provides to A. There are two possible phases in the simulation.
Phase Deniably Authenticated Decryption Queries: A submits the queries on the ciphertext σ = = (c, λ, U , R) in adaptive manner then B performs the followings: Challenge: A picks two plain text m 0 and m 1 . B picks a random bits ξ ∈ {0, 1} and encrypts m ξ . A performs the following steps to obtain the ciphertext.
• Compute c * = m ξ ⊕ k * • Compute U * = γ * P and R * = γ * Q r Return the ciphertext σ * = (c * , λ * , U * , R * ). Phase-II: A submits second series of queries to all the oracles except deniably authenticated decryption oracle. on the challenged ciphertext σ * obtained.
Guess: At the end of the IND-CCA2 game, A produces a bit ξ as it guess. Then B returns W * which is a guess for abP and is a pre-image of k * .
Probability of Success
Here we do the analysis of B's success. Consider the following events:
• let E 0 be the event occurs when A asks H 1 (W * ) during simulation. This would be same as real attack if the attack environment continues ideally. In real attack, we have . where θ is considered as security parameter such that both h 1 and h 2 are uniformly taken from a set of 2 θ elements.
Pr[E 2 ] ≤ q d 2 θ . Therefore,
APPENDIX B PROOF OF THEOREM 2
Proof: Let B takes the random instances (a, aP, bP) as input and tries to compute abP, In DA-CMA game, B uses F as subroutine and plays B's challenger. B submits the series of queries to random oracles H 1 , H 2 , deniably authenticated encryption and decryption oracles in an adaptive manner. In the simulation, B constructs two lists as L H 1 1 and L H 1 1 to store both the input and output of the queries submitting to the random oracles H 1 and H 2 respectively.
Initial: At the beginning of DA-CMA game, B executes the Setup algorithm and obtains the systems parameters param. Then B constructs sender's public key Q s = d s P and receiver's public key Q r = d r P. B provides these two parameters Q s and Q r to F.
Attack: In the DA-CMA game, the series of queries submitted in an adaptive manner to the random oracles H 1 , H 2 , deniably authenticated encryption and decryption are described bellows: H 1 -Queries: B maintains the as L H 1 1 to store the element of the form (W i , ki i ) that obtains when F asks the queries to the oracle H 1 L H 2 1 . Similarly an another list L H 1 2 is maintained by B to store the input/out entries of the form (V i , ?, k i ) obtained when F submits the queries to the oracle H 2 . The input/output is implicitly represented by the relation H 1 (d r V i ) = k i . Le d r V i is denoted by ''?'', where the index i ∈ {1 . . . q h 1 }. Since is was not stored explicitly. For H 1 (W ) query, B performs the following:
• If DDH(P, V i , Q r , W ) = for some (V i , ?, k i ) ∈ L H 1 2 , then return k i .
• Else if W = W i for some (W i , k i ) in L H 1 1 then return k i . • Else picks randomly k i ∈ {0, 1} n , add (W , k i ) into L H 1 1 and return k i . Deniably Authenticated Decryption Queries: F submits a series od queries to deniably authenticated decryption oracle in an adaptive manner on the ciphertext σ = (c, λ, U , R). B performs the following: Probability of Success Consider the following events to compute B's probability of success.
• Let E 0 be the event that F wins the game obtaining a forge ciphertext σ = (c , λ , U , R ) without asking the query H 2 (m Q s Q r W ). Hence Pr[E 0 ] ≤ 1 2 θ . This would be failed in providing a consistent simulation because one of the following events occur. 
